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INTRODUCTION
Drawing on the impeccable logic of comparative advantage, economists overwhelmingly support free trade. They typically do so by invoking a thought experiment in which, for given terms of trade or for a given set of potential trading partners, a country is shown under reasonable conditions to fare better under free trade than with restricted trade, say autarchy. Impeccable as it is, the story seems di¢cult to sell when it comes to public opinion and policy making. Why? Restrictive assumptions underlying the models used are no convincing explanation, for there are numerous examples where ideas relying on no less questionable assumptions have come to dominate policy making. A more obvious and convincing explanation is that aggregate gains from trade are typically coupled with distributional e¤ects, as economists since the early days of comparative advantage have always been very careful to point out. If these are di¢cult to deal with, policy makers will, understandably, not be too excited about thought experiments highlighting aggregate gains from trade. But there is a somewhat subtler point relating to the above mentioned thought experiment.
The usual story argues that, in a given situation, a country may gain from trade and should for its own sake reduce its trade barriers. It is, however, an entirely di¤erent question whether a certain historical change will be more harmful for a given country, or more di¢cult to deal with in terms of the distributional consequences, if it is open to trade than if it chose to run a more restrictive trade regime. History will hold di¤erent things for a countrys residents, depending on whether it is part of a globalized economic environment, or whether it follows a policy of opening and closing its border at will. When indulging into this second kind of thought experiment, however, one should not lose track of the rst. While a country may be adversely a¤ected by some historical development
because it is open to trade, the usual gains from trade argument still implies that, given this new situation, the country is likely to be better o¤ under free trade than with trade restrictions. The implication then is that the gain lost through trade restrictions would have been even larger prior to this change.
More importantly, individuals who are unfavorably a¤ected by some historical change, given their countrys openness to trade, need not be those who would gain from restricting trade in this new situation.
The second thought experiment, focusing on domestic consequences of outside forces, seems to be more in line with current concerns about globalization which importantly drive the resistance that economists face when trying to tell their tale of free trade. Very often in todays global goods and factor markets, faraway and sometimes arcane forces are perceived to impose unwelcome distributional changes on the domestic economy, and sometimes they even seem to make the whole country worse o¤. In addition to secular trends in specialization and migration, recent events have shown that even countries with sound macroeconomic policies are exposed to destabilizing forces initiated by unbalanced macroeconomic policies elsewhere in the world. Governments feel uneasy not only about these developments as such, but, more importantly, about what they can, or rather cannot, do about them. Fear of resurgent protectionist sentiment seems warrante; see Rodrik 1998 . Most governments are presumably well aware that a retreat from globalization will not be without any cost, but they might hope to at least get back into the drivers seat. Historical experience provides little comfort. Recent research strongly suggests that the late 19th century period of mass migration and booming commodity trade was followed by intended policies of globalization backlash, mainly because of the unwelcome distributional e¤ects that came with it (Williamson, 1998) . While globalization today may have gone too far (Rodrik, 1997) , a renewed backlash would most likely lead to worse. Hence, economists are called upon to shed light on hotly debated policy concerns about globalization, and in particular to separate true causation from cheap scapegoats, so as to foster a well balanced policy attitude.
Merely reiterating the principal case for free trade will not do much to convince the sceptics. There is a clear need to address specic scenarios in an empirical way, and to pay su¢cient attention to distributional concerns in addition to overall gains when doing so. While recent events have temporarily shifted public concern from trade and migration to capital mobility, in the longer run trade is likely to remain an important issue. The success of the Uruguay round notwithstanding, there is important unnished business, such as agriculture, services, and information technology, which the WTO intends to take up in a further round of negotiations. In addition, trade continues to be an important channel through which such important developments as systemic transforma-tion in eastern Europe, or the emergence of new players elsewhere in the world, are felt in the more settled economies of western Europe or the US. In either case, fear of distributional consequences for wages will play an important role in the formation of the policies pursued. While such consequences have long been attended to in theory, empirical research on the relationship between trade and wages is relatively new. It developed in the last decade from the observed coincidence in many developed countries of a) an increase in earnings inequality, particularly between skilled and unskilled wage earners, and to some extent even a fall in real wage earnings for unskilled, and b) an increase in the level of trade with less developed countries due to multilateral or preferential trade liberalization, sometimes paralleled by a signicant worsening of the aggregate trade balance. Meanwhile, a large body of literature has accumulated which tries to sort out to what extent this coincidence mirrors causation. Next to trade, the prime suspect identied was technological change. Indeed, a recent survey by Cline (1997) suggests that technology may play an equally important, if not dominant, role as an explanatory factor of wage movements.
However, a nal verdict is still pending, and it is frustrated not only by details of interpretation, but also by methodological dissent. A large number of studies have in one way or another resorted to calculating the factor content of international trade in commodities, a concept which was originally developed to empirically test the HeckscherOhlin theory of comparative advantage; see Leamer (1984) and Helpman (1998) . The principal idea underlying its use to identify possible sources of wage movements is that whenever (and for whatever reason) a country increases its net exports of skill intensive commodities relative to its net exports of raw labor intensive commodities, this should put upward pressure on relative wages for high skill labor. By calculating changes in high skill and low skill labor contents of net trade, perhaps augmented by migration ows, one might, therefore, hope to identify trade related sources of wage movements. Though trade theorists were never much enthused about this approach, it was widely used in the U.S. context (see, for instance, Borjas, Freeman and Katz, 1996 , and Baldwin and Cain, 1997 . In the European context, one might rely on this idea to estimate the e¤ects of increased eastwest trade on western and eastern European wages. Given its popularity in empirical research, and given the continuing relevance of the underlying policy issue, the theoretical foundation of the factor contents approach is worth investigating.
Recent papers by Krugman (1995) , Panagariya (1998), Leamer (1999) , and Deardor¤ (1999) have revealed important insights. While Leamer and Panagariya are very skeptical, Krugman and Deardor¤ are more sanguine about factor contents. The issue, then, does not seem to be settled yet. In this paper, I intend to provide a synthesis of the arguments as well as further insights. I
argue that previous discussions have to some extent su¤ered from blurring two issues: a) The information content of factor contents as such, and b) how this information content may be exploited in specic thought experiments in a given empirical context. Section 2 rst o¤ers a few general remarks and then goes on to delineate the information content of factor contents in a reasonably general way, without any specic thought experiment in mind. In doing so, I draw on the seminal paper by Deardor¤ and Staiger (1988) . In addition to trade, I shall explicitly discuss the role of changes in endowments and technology, and changes in the structure of complete specialization. General inequality restrictions will be addressed, as well as more restrictive cases assuming constant elasticities of substitution in di¤erent production sectors and in consumption. Section 3 then turns to specic thought experiments. The central contribution here will be a) to point out possible ways of designing specic thought experiments in which factor contents can tell us interesting things about the relationship between trade and factor prices, and b) to show how the di¤erent counterfactual equilibria emerging in these thought experiments must be interpreted. Moreover, section 3 also discusses issues of empirical calculation pertaining to such counterfactual equilibria. Section 4 o¤ers some concluding remarks.
FACTOR CONTENTS: THEORY
Since factor contents of trade ows have played such a prominent role in testing Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory, it is worth emphasizing at the outset that the purpose here is not to derive testable Heckscher-Ohlin type propositions. Instead, in a very general way the theory is assumed to hold, and the issue is how it may be used to shed light on the relationship between trade and wages. In other words, the question is whether calculating factor contents is a useful way to apply the theory. One would expect that factor contents surely have some information content, but whether it is useful depends on what, precisely, we are interested in. The purpose of this section is to delineate the information content of factor contents.
Prices versus quantities
Given that the HeckscherOhlin model does indeed stress a strong relationship between trade liberalization (or protection) and real wages, hallmarked by the celebrated StolperSamuelson theorem, it is not surprising that researchers should turn to it in their search for trade related sources of wage developments.
What is surprising, however, is that they should do so by focusing on factor contents. After all, the factor content of trade relates to quantities, while the concern addressed relates to factor prices. One of the central tenets of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory is that in an open economy domestic factor prices are to a large extent driven by world commodity prices (perhaps distorted by trade policies), without any clear-cut implication regarding the quantities traded.
Trade theorists have, therefore, repeatedly pointed out that looking at trade ows and factor contents is prone to misleading conclusions, or at least doesnt shed much light on the issue at hand. The relevant variables to look at, they argue, are changes in relative goods prices and sectoral factor productivity; see for instance Richardson (1995) .
Should we, then, take a di¤erent route, trying to explain wage movements by changes in prices on world commodity markets? There are reasons to think twice. First, it is potentially misleading to emphasize that factor prices are driven by commodity prices, as it seems to suggest that goods prices may be seen as exogenous. This is only true for a small country, which is a questionable presumption, at least when discussing the role of trade for wage decline in the industrialized world; see Krugman (1995) . In a similar vein, it should be noticed that the StolperSamuelson theorem is not really a causal relationship, but a general equilibrium relationship between two sets of endogenous variables (goods prices and factor prices). Hence, from an empirical point of view the relevant question is what are the exogenous forces that jointly drive goods and factor prices in a certain way, and in some given historical period.
One may envisage research programs pursuing this line with varying degrees of purism, including in particular the estimation of reduced form factor price equations as well as simulation experiments based on general equilibrium models. As a second point, however, one may emphasize pragmatism. More specically, weighing the cost of research against the value of the results achieved, it is hard to ignore the simple fact that factor contents is a concept that is relatively easy to implement empirically, partly because they are more readily observed than prices. It is therefore important to fully explore its information content with respect to the general aim of understanding wage movements. This is reinforced by the fact that, before the issue had even arisen, Deardor¤ and Staiger (1988) have shown that it is indeed possible to rigorously derive factor price interpretations of factor contents. It would thus be wrong to outrightly view factor contents as an empirical tool with a loose end and no clear relationship to theory. This apparently leaves us with a rather limited scope for useful application of factor contents, limited to cases where there are only external forces at work and where for some reason we are unable to observe factor price changes directly.
Domestic versus outside changes
But things start looking di¤erent, once we are willing to consider hypothetical changes, or thought experiments, instead of historical changes proper. Deardor¤ and Hakura (1994) have been the rst to suggest that this might be a promising way to frame questions about the relationship between trade and wages that are both precise and interesting. They call them but for questions, since in one way or another they amount to thought experiments where a given historical situation is compared with a hypothetical situation which in all respects is the same, except for some well dened di¤erence in trade ows. Krugman (1995) follows this idea in his line of defense against fundamentalist critics of factor contents, as does Deardor¤ (1999) in his response to Leamer (1999) . I shall 1 Further examples may be found in Bhagwati and Dehejia (1994) , Deardor¤ and Hakura (1994) , and Richardson (1995 For any given trading equilibrium, commodities absorbed domestically may thus be grouped into two subsets Q and N , respectively, with Q indicating those commodities produced at home and N indicating noncompetitive imports.
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We thus have
¤ . We dene a diagonal matrix Z of dimension equal to the number of noncompetitive imports where the ith diagonal element, z i > 1, is the ratio between minimum unit costs of producing good i, given factor prices w, and the corresponding 2 Trade theorists often identify their models as either being of the mobile factors (or HeckscherOhlin) or of the specic factors (or RicardoViner) type. The former is typically associated with the long run and has the number of commodities at least equal to the number of factors, while the latter, almost by necessity, has more factors than goods and is usually associated with the short run. Either interpretation is possible for the model used here. However, empirical applications of factor contents typically restrict the number of factors in such a way that the relevant interpretation is of the HeckscherOhlin type. This interpretation is also favored by the emphasis placed on noncompetitive imports; see below.
3 Although widely used, the term noncompeting imports is a bit misleading here. These imports are very much competitive, so much so that domestic production of such goods has ceased, due to costs exceeding prices.
price p i . Moreover, we dene T as the net trade vector, i.e., the di¤erence between domestic production and absorption. Any competitive equilibrium of this trading economy is fully described by a set of full employment conditions and a set of zero prot conditions:
Equations 1a Notice what we have not assumed for this equilibrium. We did not assume that trade be free or balanced, nor did we require international factor price equalization or a common technology for this country and its trading partner(s).
For instance, if we denote the vector of (specic) trade taxes by t, then aggregate income may be written as
where p Q0 Q is income at domestic prices, and t 0 T is net revenue from trade policy. The trade balance at world prices is
4 Regarding the HeckscherOhlin versus RicardoViner interpretation of the model, one should note that linearly homogeneous production functions with positive amounts of all specic factors implies that there will be positive production of all goods. Hence, emphasizing noncompetitive imports makes sense only in a HeckscherOhlin interpretation. 5 More specically, t i > 0 indicates a tari¤ if T i < 0, while it indicates an export subsidy if
where
, and world prices are p ¤ = p ¡ t. We may interpret t as including tari¤equivalents of quantitative restrictions, with t 0 T including rents arising from such restrictions. Factor income is
and expenditure is
Corresponding autarchy equilibrium: Following Deardor¤ and Staiger (1988), we may now construct an autarchy equilibrium that corresponds to the above trading equilibrium. This is a hypothetical equilibrium where a country would reach the same equilibrium prices for goods and factors without any trade as it does in the trading equilibrium. If such corresponding autarchy equilibria exist for two di¤erent trading equilibria, we may use them to treat the factor price changes between the trading equilibria as if they had happened in a closed economy. The factor contents of trade provide the key link between the trading equilibria and their autarchy counterparts. Hence, whatever we know about factor price changes in a closed economy should help us to see if and how factor contents carry useful information on factor prices obtaining in di¤erent trading equilibria.
Trade in the above equilibrium has two e¤ects. First, for commodities Q;
it allows the economy to consume quantities that di¤er from domestic production, without there being any di¤erence, at the margin, in the opportunity cost between producing them at home and obtaining them through imports. And secondly, for commodities N ; trade a¤ords the economy goods at a cost which is lower than the opportunity cost of producing them at home. We may identify this latter e¤ect of trade as equivalent to some technological progress, and without loss of generality we may measure it by means of an equivalent Hicks neutral progress (see also Deardor¤, 1999) . Indeed, this is exactly what the matrix Z above does. More specically, if the economy were to experience a
Hicksneutral technical progress such that instead of using (costminimizing) inputs A N per unit of output it would use inputs e A N = Z ¡1 A N , then it would nd in the above equilibrium that the opportunity cost of obtaining goods N through imports is equal, at the margin, to producing them at home. I shall therefore refer to Z as the Hicks-matrix.
We now dene the factor content of the trading equilibrium as
Notice that this is a hypothetical construct. We treat noncompetitive imports as if they were produced at home, taking advantage of the above mentioned tradeequivalent technical progress. 6 Notice also that we may write
where e F C is the hypothetical factor content of domestic absorption, employing again the domestic input mix according the improved technology.
Envisage an economy which has endowments
], but which otherwise is the same as the economy underlying the above trading equilibrium. It can now be shown that the equilibrium for this economy is a corresponding autarchy equilibrium. It has the same prices for goods and factors, with production equal to C and, therefore,
The proof is perfectly analogous to the one without noncompeting imports which is provided by Deardor¤ and Staiger (1988) , hence we may proceed without. It must be noted that this holds for an arbitrary trade policy which, of course, is an important determinant of trade and thus its factor content. This begs a seemingly awkward questions, since we may conceive of di¤erent trade policies leading to the same trade vector, but with di¤erent factor prices. How can an economy with endowment e V calculated as in 8 with a given trade vector behind e F have di¤erent autarchy factor prices? The answer is that such differences in factor prices would be reected in, and thus captured by, di¤erent factor input coe¢cients used to calculate the factor content. Hence, whatever the trade policy behind a given trade vector, and whatever the associated factor prices, an economy with endowment e V and technology e A, if left in isolation, would reproduce these prices as an autarchy equilibrium. This point will be important to bear in mind when considering various thought experiments in section 3 below. It should further be noticed that the aggregate value of net exports of factor content is equal to the aggregate trade balance at domestic prices:
While trade is trivially balanced in the autarchy equilibrium, it fully corresponds to a trading equilibrium which may exhibit unbalanced trade. In other words, expenditure p 0 C in the autarchy equilibrium is always equal to w 0 e V, but it need not be equal to w 0 V. Figure 1 : Factor contents and noncompeting imports Figure 1 illustrates the argument for four goods, where goods 3 and 4 are noncompeting, with unitvalue isoquants 3 and 4. With factor prices w, these goods will not be produced at home, but only abroad where factor prices are w ¤ . C 3 and C 4 are the factor bundles that would be used if the home country were to produce its own consumption of these goods, respectively. The equivalent Hicksneutral technology improvement represented by the matrix Z above would move the unit value isoquants for these goods to 3 and 4, respectively.
Producing its own consumption of these goods with this improved technology, the home economy would use factor bundlesC 3 andC 4 . As drawn, with the other consumption bundles C 1 and C 2 as well as production bundles Q 1 and Q 2 , the home economy has balanced trade, w 0 e F= 0. If expenditure were larger than factor income, a factor content vector like e F 0 would materialize which has a negative value at factor prices w.
The information content of factor contents
Some of the discussion in the literature on factor contents has su¤ered from blurring two conceptually distinct issues. One relates to the information content of factor contents with respect to factor prices. The issue is to nd out under what conditions, and in which sense, factor contents can tell us interesting things about factor prices in two trading equilibria. And the other is to design an interesting thought experiment which allows to exploit this information content of factor contents in an empirical context. Given two trading equilibria indexed by subscripts 1 and 2, the rst issue is whether knowledge of e F 1 and e F 2 can tell us anything about w 2 as compared to w 1 . The second issue is how these two equilibria should be dened in an empirical exercise, such that factor contents can tell us interesting things.
It might be argued that if both equilibria are fully observed (including exogenous variables), we wouldnt be bothering about the information content of factor contents. However, the next section will show that it is precisely situations Given the existence of corresponding autarchy equilibria for both 1 and 2, does combining empirical knowledge of factor contents with theoretical knowledge of how factor prices are determined in closed economies give useful insights on w 2 ¡ w 1 ? Drawing on 8, in general we have
A key question therefore is how e V 2 ¡ e V 1 relates to w 2 ¡ w 1 : Dixit and Norman (1980) have shown that there is an inequality restriction on autarchy factor price di¤erences and corresponding endowment di¤erences between two countries sharing common preferences and a common technology. If we apply this to a comparison across two autarchy equilibria for a given economy with a constant technology we obtain
Notice that a constant technology implies Z 2 = Z 1 ; see below. Notice also that for this result to hold, aggregate expenditure must be the same in both equilibria. This has two interpretations. One is to assume that expenditure remains constant across equilibria for some given initial price normalization (the choice of some numéraire commodity, say). This implies that, unless aggregate income w 0 V remains constant as well, there will be a change in the trade balance.
In other words, for any given price normalization inequality 11 does not generally hold. A preferable alternative is to assume that prices are separately normalized in the two equilibria, such that aggregate expenditure is unity in both. In general, this implies a change in the price normalization across equilibria. As pointed out by Deardor¤ and Staiger (1988) , in this case factor prices may directly be interpreted as distributional variables, indicating factor incomes as shares of aggregate expenditure. 7 Notice, however, that with this interpretation factor price changes loose any signicance whatsoever with respect to welfare changes as between situations 1 and 2.
A further observation is that in an open economy factor price changes relate to changes in the factor content of consumption in the same way as they relate to changes in endowment in a closed economy. This follows from 11 if 7 is inserted into 10. But what about the factor content of trade? From 10 and 11 it is evident that, in general, the factor content of trade as such has no information content with respect to factor prices. The weak Deardor¤ and Staiger (1988) result, which is an inequality restriction analogous to 11, but relating to the fac- Endowment changes: If technology is constant across equilibria but endowment changes cannot be ruled out, one is tempted to explore into possible relationships between changes e F 2 ¡ e F 1 and V 2 ¡V 1 across time, given the established 7 Helpman (1984) shows, comparing two countries 1 and 2, that without normalizing expenditure in the above way, we have (w 2 ¡ w 1 ) 0 ³¸2 e V 2 ¡¸1 e V 1´· 0; with¸1 and¸2 two arbitrary positive constants. Setting these equal to 1 has the above intuitive interpretation.
HeckscherOhlinVanek tradition of relating factor contents to endowment differences at any given point in time. But this does not lead us very far inasmuch as these relationships assume international factor price equalization, which much of the literature in this tradition does. A notable exception is Helpman (1984) who explores the relationship between bilateral factor contents and factor price di¤erences between countries with di¤ering endowments. Such a relationship seems to o¤er a more direct route to investigate the information content of factor contents with respect to factor price changes for a given country across time.
Unlike the Deardor¤Staiger approach, any interpretation of factor contents so obtained would hold with simultaneous endowment changes. To my knowledge, this approach has not been explored in the literature on trade and wages. I do so in appendix A.1, but the result is disappointing. While it is possible to nd relevant restrictions on factor contents and factor prices, these are of a form which negates empirical implementation. One is thus left with cases where
, and where the information content of factor contents derives from the weak DS result. Leamer (1999) and others argue that this is a fatal limitation. This is certainly true if one looks at historical situations across time. However, the restriction may be innocuous for carefully designed thought experiments. I shall return to this in the next subsection, after considering technology changes.
Noncompeting imports: In the presence of noncompeting imports, each corresponding autarchy equilibrium features a hypothetical technology, determined by the respective Hicksmatrix Z which relates to the underlying true technology through the prevailing equilibrium prices; see equation 1b above. For the time being, we assume a constant true technology. If Z 2 = Z 1 , we may look at the two autarchy equilibria as having the same technology and the presence of noncompeting imports is irrelevant; see also Deardor¤ (1999) . In general, however, the two Hicksmatrices will di¤er, and for purposes of interpretation the endowment change e V 2 ¡ e V 1 must be seen as paralleled by an equivalent With the initial allocation, output of commodity i changes by ¿ i £ 100 percent, where ¿ i = z i;2 ¡ z i;1 : Notice that ¿ i , unlike z i;2 or z i;1 , may well be negative, for instance if good i is a noncompetitive in situation 1, while it is competitively produced at home in situation 2. Ifp i is the relative price change for good i, the output value of the initial allocation in sector i changes by (¿ i +p i ) £ 100 percent. The zero prot conditions require that the costs of all allocations change in line with their output value. If relative factor prices are to remain constant, all factor prices must change by a common factor which must in turn be equal across sectors. Indeed, keeping in mind that we have chosen a normalization such that expenditure is always equal to unity, this factor must now be set to zero, ruling out any change in aggregate expenditure due to the technology change considered. Hence, we havep i = ¡ ¿ i . Under
CobbDouglas preferences and constant expenditure, this implies b
which case the initial allocation is indeed a full equilibrium. 10 More generally, if ¾ ij is the elasticity of substitution in demand, we have b
.e., excess demand for good 8 See, for instance, Richardson (1995) and Jones, and Engerman (1996) . 9 Note that we have already restricted our attention to relative factor rewards through our choice of normalization above. 10 Notice that there are no further requirements, whatsoever, on production. Krugman (1995) treats technological change in a two commodity model using xed input coe¢cients, whereas Deardor¤ (1997) assumes CobbDouglas technologies.
i is larger than for good j. In a two twobytwo world, this would imply that the technology change has the additional e¤ect of increasing the price of good i relative to good j, thereby changing income distribution in favor of good is intensive factor. Notice that this holds irrespective of whether ¿ i > ¿ j , or the other way round! Whatever is the case, this same technological change would work against the factor used intensively in good i if ¾ ij < 1.
Thus, the consequence of noncompeting imports for factor price changes is relatively easy to pin down for the twobytwo case, or else if individual commodities are a¤ected in isolation; see also Krugman (1995) , and Deardor¤, (1999) . A conclusion holding more generally is that it is immaterial whether the sectors with an equivalent technological improvement (noncompeting imports in situation 2 but not in situation 1) or deterioration (noncompeting imports in situation 1 but not in situation 2) are intensive in some factor (skilled labor, say). It is the elasticities of substitution in demand that matter instead. We may venture to say, albeit somewhat loosely, that relative to a situation where non competitive imports do not matter, we will see those factors favorably a¤ected which are intensively used in the commodities favored by a high elasticity of substitution in demand.
Technological change proper: Technology, next to trade, has been the prime suspect for contributing to the erosion of unskilled wage income relative to other incomes. Indeed, much of the literature has concluded that technological change, rather than changes in trade ows, is the main culprit. Generally, we must expect that the information content of factor contents almost completely vanishes if we allow for arbitrary technological changes. In a sense, this is a trivial observation which, one might argue, is of little help. At the same time, however, it is less innocuous than it may seem, for it negates the procedure commonly used in empirical research to separate technology from trade e¤ects. This procedure requires that one rst tries to nd out how much of an observed factor price change can be attributed to trade, and then to attribute the rest to some unspecied technological change; see Cline (1997) . This is fundamentally awed. With an unspecied technological change operating in the background, factor contents have no information content whatsoever and, therefore, also do not permit such a residual interpretation. This is a general point, extending beyond factor contents, which has not been su¢ciently noticed in empirical research. Once we allow that technology may be changing, we can no longer measure the e¤ects of trade separately, whether through factor contents or in some other way, since these e¤ects will depend on the exact nature of the technology change. as by necessity in an autarchy equilibrium, it follows that aggregate income for each factor is a constant fraction of overall expenditure: w kṼk =¯kE. Remembering that we have normalized prices such that E = 1 in both equilibria, we have w k;2 /w k;1 =Ṽ k;1
.Ṽ k;2 , or equivalently
This equation simply states that for a loglinear economy with constant expenditure the general equilibrium own price elasticity of aggregate factor demand is unity, and the cross price elasticities are zero. In empirical applications it is often assumed that this may be generalized to a nonunitary own price elasticity, drawn from outside econometric research, maintaining zero cross price elasticities; see for instance Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1996 ). Deardor¤ (1999 has shown that such a case indeed arises if the economy is CES, with a common elasticity of substitution in preferences and all production functions.
We then have
where ¾ is the common elasticity of substitution. Appendix A.2 shows that this follows as a special case from a more general relationship between factor demands and factor prices in a closed economy where elasticities of substitution are allowed to di¤er. Panagariya (1998) shows that in a CES economy with identical elasticities, relative factor prices are driven by endowment changes according to
This begs two questions. Panagariya (1998) complements this classication by making a distinction between I) the impact of trade on wages in a given period, and II) the contribution of trade to the change in wages between two periods. All of these cases envisage some change. A crucial question now is whether or not these are strictly historical changes. If so, the likelihood of changes in many dimensions (endowments, tastes, technology) is of course quite large, and the above discussion suggests factor contents will be of only limited use, if at all. However, by invoking certain counterfactual equilibria we may succeed in avoiding some of the problems encountered above, and factor contents may turn out to be a useful tool of analysis.
Question 3 is the one that comes closest to the way many people think about the e¤ects of globalization, the principal concern being that economies heavily exposed to trade react di¤erently to just about any exogenous change than do economies that are almost closed to trade. Suppose, then, some arbitrary exogenous change has driven the economy from equilibrium 1 to equilibrium 2. We assume both equilibria are fully observed, including, in particular, w 1 and w 2 . Notice that we do not worry about the distinction between exogenous changes in domestic and foreign conditions, as in question 2. Instead, we try to isolate the role that trade, or openness of the economy, plays in the way that exogenous changes of whatever nature are channeled through to wage e¤ects.
This can be accomplished by constructing counterfactual equilibria.
For instance, in line with Deardor¤ and Hakura, we may envisage an equilibrium2 where all exogenous variables are as in equilibrium 2, but for some government policy instruments forcing trade to T 1 instead of T 2 . If we can calculate e V 2 and e V¹ 2 according to 8, we may rely on above arguments to infer w¹ 2 ¡ w 2 from e V¹ 2 ¡ e V 2 , and w¹ 2 ¡ w 1 then gives the answer to question 3.
Equivalently, we may envisage a decomposition of the actual change:
where the rst component is the tradeinduced wage e¤ect and the second is viewed as not related to trade. It is worth pointing out the di¤erence to the approach commonly used in the literature to separate trade from technology as a source of wage movement, which was criticized on page 19 above. That approach involves trying to explain observed wage changes by observed trade changes and then attributing the unexplained residual to technology. By way of contrast,
here we infer what factor prices would have been with a certain counterfactual trade pattern, calling the di¤erence to observed factor prices a trade-induced e¤ect. It is quite clear that the usefulness of this approach critically hinges on the precise interpretation of the counterfactual trade pattern. I shall return to this below. A further point worth emphasizing is that by construction of the thought experiment endowments, technology and tastes are the same in equilibrium 2 and2, hence we have e V¹ 2 ¡ e V 2 = ¡ ³ e F¹ 2 ¡ e F 2´, and if we are willing to assume CES we can even compute the desired wage e¤ect from factor contents alone, as indicated above.
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In 15 wage movements that would have occurred with trade held at T 1 are attributed to nontrade causes, dening the remainder as a traderelated e¤ect. There is some plausibility to this, but it begs two questions. First, what, precisely, is the interpretation of a counterfactual equilibrium where exogenous variables are as in situation 2, but where trade is T 1 : As will be shown in the next subsection, for question 3 to be well dened, one has to be precise about the kind of exogenous variable that one assumes to adjust such that T 1 is an equilibrium trade vector. And secondly, the procedure involves a fair amount of arbitrariness. Why not extend the but for idea to trade as such and do so not only for situation 2, but for the initial equilibrium 1 as well? We then have counterfactual equilibria1 and2 where all exogenous variables are as in situation 1 and 2, respectively, but where there is no trade at all. w 1 ¡ w¹ 1 might then be called the trade e¤ect on wages in the initial equilibrium, and the decomposition now emerging is
where again the rst (bracketed) term is the wagerelated e¤ect, and the second is what we treat as not related to trade. 14 Indeed, one might even consider turning the Deardor¤-Hakura comparison upside down and dene the counterfactual1 as arising if a suitable trade policy had ensured trade to be T 2 , with all exogenous variables as in the factual equilibrium 1. Setting w¹ 2 = w 2 , the decomposition then becomes
With this interpretation, we are looking at factor price changes that would have been observed with the initial exogenous variables except for some special inuence that has caused trade to change from T 1 to T 2 , which is the rst term in 17. This is treated as the tradeinduced part of factor price movements, and the remainder is again viewed as not related to trade.
Note that in all cases considered historical equilibria are compared with contemporaneous counterfactual equilibria. This is crucial, since it avoids movement across time when exploiting the information content of factor contents, thus escaping many of the problems considered in the previous section. While the construction of a full decomposition along the lines suggested does require further historical observations, this can be accomplished without any further application of factor contents across time. More specically, for decomposition 15 we start with an observation of w 2 from which we infer w¹ 2 , relying on calculations of e V¹ 2 ¡ e V 2 using factor contents. Once we have inferred w¹ 2 , the decomposition is completed by observing w 1 . In other words, if factor contents can be used to isolate the trade e¤ect on wages at any given point in time, one can also decompose changes across time into a traderelated and a nontraderelated part; see also Panagariya (1998). However, this is possible only if we can fully observe the two relevant equilibria, including factor prices.
3.2 How should we interpret the counterfactuals? 
The Deardor¤Hakura exercise (decomposition 15) has T¹ 1 = T 1 and, therefore, R¹ 1 = R 1 , while setting T¹ 2 = T 1 , with the policy variable R¹ 2 adjusting accordingly, so as to support T 1 , given G 2 . In turn, the Panagariya experiment (decomposition 16) sets T¹ 1 = T¹ 2 = 0, again with appropriately adjusted policy variables R¹ 1 and R¹ 2 . Finally, decomposition 17 requires T¹ 1 = T 2 and T¹ 2 = T 2 .
Indeed, it is only a small step to question 4 above which in e¤ect xes prices instead of trade in the counterfactual equilibria, but I shall not pursue this any further.
In view of the popularity of what Anderson and Neary (1998) is the di¤erence between policies R s and R ¹ s ? There will normally be several policies leading to a given trade vector T ¹ s , not all of which will give rise to the same factor prices. To see this, consider achieving a specied trade pattern T ¹ s for a small economy by means of consumption taxes/subsidies, coupled with a suitable expenditure policy, as opposed to using tari¤s which also a¤ect producer prices. There will be di¤erent factor prices although in both cases trade is at T ¹ s . Notice that this even holds true for the case where we set T¹ 1 = T¹ 2 = 0. Invoking autarchy, i.e., assuming closed borders, is perhaps the easiest or most natural, but by no means the only way to think about zero trade. More generally, whatever the trade vector T ¹ s , to have a well dened question we need to be more precise about the government policy that makes it a counterfactual equilib- 
For an arbitrary trade vector it is not clear, a priori, if such tari¤ equivalents do exist, but if T ¹ s is not too di¤erent from T s one may be willing to assume they do.
16 But even so, t ¹ s may not be unique. If so, di¤erent sets of tari¤s compatible with an equilibrium trade vector T ¹ s will in general lead to di¤erent factor prices. We thus face the uneasy fact that in general there is no onetoone relationship between the trade vectors T and the factor price vectors w in the above counterfactual equilibria1 and2. Hence, question 3, in general does not permit a clearcut answer. For the above thought experiments to be well dened, the trade policies envisaged to support a counterfactual trade volume T ¹ s need to be specied in su¢cient detail. Notice, however, that all of this leaves the information content of factor contents as such unharmed. Whatever the precise policy behind T¹ 1 , and the prices w¹ 1 associated with it, it still remains true that an economy with endowment e V¹ 1 as in 8, if left in isolation, would reproduce these prices as an autarchy equilibrium. 
Calculation
A nal point relates to practical problems of calculating factor contents. Since we do not know w ¹ s indeed, we want to infer w ¹ s from factor contents we also 15 This trade policy interpretation of a counterfactual was suggested by Deardor¤ (1997) .
An application following this idea is Baldwin and Cain (1997) . 16 Moreover, it should be noticed that arbitrarily xing net trade at given international prices In all other cases the factor prices determined by a specic trade policy would be reected in the associated input matrix A ¹ s . Being counterfactual, however, this is nonobservable, and using A s instead involves a measurement error which needs to be taken into consideration. Fortunately, this problem does not arise for decomposition 16, where the counterfactual equilibria1 and2, respectively, are the autarchy equilibria. For in this case, since T ¹ s = 0, e F ¹ s = 0 as well, whatever the relevant coe¢cients A ¹ s .
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Trade and wages are both endogenous variables. Exploring a relationship between the two makes sense only if the natural approach for some reason is not feasible, which would be to construct an explicit model of how trade and wages are jointly determined by exogenous forces, and to implement this model empirically in order to nd out which of these forces was dominant in certain periods in time. However, very often in the context of globalization scenarios, explicitly modeling the exogenous changes is impossible because they are too large in number, too complicated, or because one doesnt even have a clear notion of what they are. Under such circumstances, resorting to factor contents of trade may be an alternative approach worth pursuing. But the information that may be extracted from factor contents is rather limited, the assumptions necessary to do so are quite restrictive, and, depending on the precise circumstances, additional observations may be required to obtain any information at all.
It is generally important to separate the following two issues. a): If e F 1 and e F 2 are the factor content vectors of two arbitrary trading equilibria, how are they related to the corresponding factor price vectors w 1 and w 2 ? And b):
How may we dene e F 1 and e F 2 in a given empirical context in order to learn interesting things about factor prices that we cannot observe otherwise.
Factor contents do not allow any inference on changes in the wellbeing of factor owners, but only on changes in the functional distribution of real income.
Given the heavy emphasis on income distribution in the current discussion on globalization, this may not be much of a restriction, but it is nonetheless an important point which needs to be duly observed when interpreting empirical
results. The precise way in which distribution e¤ects may be inferred is governed by the normalization assumptions on the price system which are necessary to pin down the relationship between factor contents and factor prices, Moreover, in general inference on income distribution is only possible in the weak sense of a summary measure of the direction in which relative factor prices have been inuenced by the exogenous change in question. Focusing on individual factor prices requires further specic assumptions regarding the elasticities of substitution in the underlying technology and in preferences. Whether or not additional information, as for instance on domestic endowment changes or technology, is necessary to arrive at a reasonably safe conclusion very much depends on the specic thought experiment in which factor contents are employed. Hence the importance of separating a) from b). Such thought experiments may be designed in various di¤erent ways for a given historical episode under investigation, and one may conceivably do so in such a way that no additional information is needed for a useful interpretation of factor contents.
Technological change may play a role in two ways. It may be an analytical vehicle through which specialization e¤ects are brought into the picture, or it may be technological change proper. Specialization e¤ects can be shown in general to be friends to those factors intensively used in commodities that are in turn favored by a high elasticity of substitution in demand. If a completely unspecied technological change proper is present, then factor contents have no information content whatsoever, and any attempt to attribute residual factor price changes that cannot be explained by observed factor contents is without theoretical foundation. When specic technological changes are contemplated in connection with the factor contents approach, then, contrary to widespread habit, the appropriate perspective is that of a closed economy.
A suggestive way to construct thought experiments that usefully rely on factor contents is to focus on counrterfactual trade volumes, i.e., a benchmark net trade vector which di¤ers from the one observed in a given historical situ- 
If the prot function is di¤erentiable at fp 1 ;¸1V 1 g ; then w 1 = ¦ V (p 1 ;¸1V 1 ) = ¦ V (p 1 ; V 1 ) where the latter equality follows from zero degree homogeneity of ¦ V ;and analogously for w 2 : If it is not di¤erentiable, factor prices are not uniquely determined by the prot function, but they must still support the prot function from above.
By complete analogy, we write convexity in p as ¦(p 2 ;¸1V 1 ) · ¦ (p 1 ;¸1V 1 ) +¸1Q
¦(p 1 ;¸2V 2 ) · ¦ (p 2 ;¸2V 2 ) +¸2Q
Here we have exploited linear homogeneity of the prot function in endowments.
Moreover, we have used Q 1 = ¦ p (p 1 ; V 1 ) ; given di¤erentiability, and the pre-vious remarks apply mutatis mutandis.
If p 1 = p 2 equations 19a and 19b imply (w 2 ¡ w 1 ) 0 (¸2V 2 ¡¸1V 1 ) · 0
This is the result that Helpman derives comparing countries. Here, we can interpret it for a given country across two trading equilibria. Given constant commodity prices, a change in factor prices can only occur if this country moves from one diversication cone to another. If this happens factor price changes and endowment changes satisfy inequality 20. Notice that so far there is no restriction on price normalization. Using 7 we may rewrite inequality 20 as 
We are now free to choose positive¸s plus a suitable price normalization. We may imagine using these degrees of freedom to ensure that the right hand side is zero. But the question is can we do so by choosing a normalization which permits an intuitive interpretation of factor price changes (for instance w 
A.2 Factor prices and factor demands under CES
In one way or another, the empirical literature on trade and wages has assumed that elasticities of aggregate factor demands may be employed to infer factor price changes from factor supply changes which have, in turn, been calculated using, among other things, factor contents. Given the specic interpretation of factor contents, these would have to be general equilibrium elasticities for closed economies. Unless economies are characterized by a common elasticity of substitution in all demand and production, such elasticities will heavily depend on sectoral detail. This appendix derives general equilibrium elasticities of factor demands for an arbitrary number of goods and factors under the assumption that preferences and production feature CES, but with di¤erent elasticities of substitution. Following common practice, we usȩ ki to denote the share of factor k employed in sector i, with P i¸k i = 1, with matrix notation ¤;and µ ik to denote the cost share of factor k in the production of good i, with P k µ ik = 1. Under CES preferences, demand for commodity i is
where°is the constant elasticity of substitution and ® i is a constant parameter indicating the importance of good i in consumption. E is expenditure as dened in 5. In turn, if´i is sector is elasticity of substitution in production, demand for factor k in sector i is
where c i (w) is the minimum unit cost in this sector, given factor prices w, while¯i k is a parametric factor intensity term. Autarchy equilibrium requires Q i = C i and c i (w) = p i . We havê
Due to Sephards Lemma, the elasticity of c i (w) with respect to factor price w k is µ ik .
Following Jones and Scheinkman (1977) , we may write the di¤erentiated full employment conditions in matrix form as ªŵ + ¤Q =V;
where the element Ã kj of ª gives the elasticity of total factor k use with respect to a change in factor price w j at constant outputs. The second term on the left captures the e¤ects of output changes on factor demand. ¤ is the matrix representation of factor allocations¸k i as dened above. Given the above factor demands, we have
Given the above demand functions 22 and 23, and bearing in mind our normalization E = 1, for a closed economy we havê
With this in mind, we can write
where the elements of the matrix are
Equation 25 
Exploring the properties of Á = ª + , we see that
These are the general equilibrium elasticities of total demand for factor k with respect the price of factor j. Notice that Á kk is always negative, while the individual cross price elasticities are unclear in sign. The special case wheré i =°= ¾ implies Á kk = ¡¾ and Á kj = 0 and gives rise to equation 13. In the more general case the usual procedure of inferring factor price changes from supply changes through an inversion of 30 is no longer straightforward.
